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Crossing the Melfa River 
Lieutenant Edward J. Perkins, DSO 
T he recce troop of an armoured regiment consists of eleven light American General 
Stuart or "Honey" tanks. From these the 
turrets have been removed and instead a . 50 
Browning machine gun is mounted. The vehicle 
carries a crew of five and its fire power besides 
the .50 includes a .30 Browning, a Bren gun, a 
PlAT and fourTornrnies. We also carry prepared 
charges and grenades. In small arms weapons, 
our fire power per man is a as large as any force 
in the army. Our job is close recce both of the 
ground and ofthe enemy which we are prepared 
to do either from our vehicles or on foot. 
For the Melfa crossing, six of my tanks were 
taken for use by engineers who were travelling 
with us and my troop consisted of only five 
tanks. As a matter of fact, my own tank had a 
mechanical failure soon after we crossed the 
start line and I had to switch to my sergeant's 
tank. At no time during the operation did the 
troop consist of more than four tanks carrying 
in all twenty men. 
The plan of the operation was that a force 
commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Vokes of 
the British Columbia Dragoons (BCD) and 
including the Irish Regiment of Canada, was to 
push through the gap in the Adolf Hitler Line 
which had been made by 1st Canadian Division. 
They were to advance about 8000 yards and 
then form a strong point or "firm base." My 
regiment was to go through this strong point 
and advance the remaining 4000 yards to the 
Melfa. We were then to seize a crossing and to 
hold it while other troops passed over and 
continued the advance. My job was to lead the 
regiment during the advance to get to the river 
as quickly as possible, find a crossing and get 
over. The Commanding Officer (CO) would 
then push over "A" Company of the motor 
battalion who were under his command, and if 
possible, get a tank squadron over, although 
whether this last would be possible, was not 
certain. 
The Vokes force pushed over the start line 
at 0600 hours. At 0800 hours, the CO sent me 
forward to liaise with them and to find out what 
was happening. I found that while the preceding 
units were not encountering great opposition 
from the enemy, they were having considerable 
difficulty in getting their tanks forward over 
many obstacles and the rate of advance was 
consequently slow. I spent most ofthe morning 
reporting progress to my CO who was 
impatiently waiting in the assembly area two or 
three thousand yards back. 
At about 1130 hours, we got orders to move 
forward. Progress was still very slow both 
because ofthe many defiles and the congestion 
on the road. We started to pass through the 
BCD tanks, many of which were firing, but at 
what I could not see. Eventually at about 1340 
hours, we were clear of them and on our own. 
I headed straight up the centre line. The 
country was close and visibility limited. It was 
not very easy to map-read, but I had a good set 
of air photographs and never had any trouble 
in keeping track of my position. The first 
enemy I saw was about a thousand yards from 
the BCD. A half-track was parked behind a 
house with its crew around it. My troop opened 
fire on the crew who tried to run for it. Five 
were hit and two apparently managed to get 
away. About 2000 yards further on, a Panther 
tank suddenly carne across my right front 
travelling very quickly at a range of about 300 
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yards. The crew commander was standing in 
the turret with most of his chest exposed. I 
immediately opened up on him with my .50 
Browning and had the satisfaction of seeing 
him slump forward out of his cupola. The 
Panther made no effort to retaliate and I kept 
going forward as fast as I could. A little further 
on I saw two more tanks to the left. I heard "A" 
Squadron getting ready for them over the 
wireless and so I kept going. Apparently they 
did not see me for they did not fire. As we came 
close to the river bank, I saw a house in which 
there was movement. We immediately opened 
up on it. A few seconds later, a white flag 
appeared at the end of the windows to be 
followed when our fire ceased by eight Germans 
with their hands up. I could not be bothered by 
prisoners, so I waited a few seconds until a 
carrier from a scout platoon of the motor 
battalion which was working with "A" Squadron 
came up. I turned the prisoners over to the 
carrier's crew then pushed on to the river 
bank. We reached it at about 1500 hours. 
When we were planning the operation, the 
CO and I studied the ground by means of air 
photographs. We found at least two possible 
crossings, and of these, we deliberately chose 
the most difficult for the initial crossing, since 
it was far less likely to be defended. The plan 
was that "C" Squadron on the left would later 
try the other crossing, but before this part of 
the plot could be put into effect, they became 
involved in a major tank battle. It turned out 
that the best crossing was effectively covered 
by many anti-tank weapons, but the one we 
had chosen was virtually undefended. 
By this time, one of my tanks had become 
lost in the difficult country and there were only 
three left. I parked them under cover and 
dismounted with Sergeant Macey to carry out 
a recce of the Grossing. We posted three men 
with Bren guns to cover us and began our 
search. Towards the left, the bank was 
impassable, but about 75 yards to the right, 
there was a sort of ledge leading down into the 
river bed. This was very steep and difficult, but 
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still passable to tanks. All along the river bank, 
were well prepared enemy positions which we 
searched as we went along. The enemy had 
obviously vacated them in great haste as there 
was kit equipment lying about in profusion. 
Sergeant Macey and I climbed down into the 
stream-bed and up the far bank. As we did so, 
we came under Spandau fire from the right and 
one of the Bren gunners was shot in the 
shoulder. This was the only casualty of the 
whole operation. Sergeant Macey and I got 
across safely and into cover on the far side. At 
this point, we came under co-ax fire from an 
"A" Squadron tank as "A" Squadron had now 
come up to the river bank to support us. 
The track on the far side was even more 
difficult than that on the near side. I decided, 
however, that it could be made passable, though 
hard work would be necessary. I remained on 
the far bank to guide the tanks up it while 
Sergeant Macey returned to guide them down 
the near bank. The crossing was successfully 
completed one tank at a time, but getting up 
the far bank required a certain amount of field 
engineering. I sent two men with Bren guns up 
on the top of the bank to cover us while the 
remaining thirteen went to work. There was an 
obstructing bank upon which we exploded 
three prepared charges. It was also necessary 
to widen the crack in one place, and to do this 
we built a sort of retaining wall using several 
tree trunks and then filled up the gap with dirt. 
We did some furious work with pick and shovel, 
which if not the soldier's favourite weapons, 
are among his most useful. In retrospect I 
think this was the most ticklish part of the 
whole business. While we were not actually 
under fire, we knew that the enemy must have 
an idea of what we were up to and might be 
expected to do something at any time. 
Everything depended on speed - in an 
amazingly short time the job was finished. 
We got the tanks up the track and into a 
hull down position below the bank. About a 
hundred yards to my left was a house showing 
signs of enemy occupation. I decided that our 
next task must be to capture it. Myself, Sergeant 
Macey and three men carrying two tommies 
and a Bren gun, crept along under cover of the 
bank and approached the house from its back 
door. As I rushed through the court-yard and 
into the house, I saw eight paratroopers staring 
through the window and loopholes in the 
direction of the other crossing, the one which 
we had decided not to use. I shouted to "drop-
it," and they turned around in considerable 
astonishment. They were big, well-built men 
armed to the teeth and for a moment, I didn't 
know what was going to happen. My trigger 
finger itched, but I did not open fire. Suddenly, 
one dropped his rifle to be followed instantly by 
all the others and their hands rose in sullen 
astonishment. There was one officer, one NCO 
and six other ranks. A search of the house 
revealed no more. Obviously they had expected 
us to attack the main crossing and were 
unprepared for this unexpected development. 
I immediately organized the position for 
defence. The three tanks were brought into a 
hull-down position on the right of the house 
and we dismounted some of the smaller 
weapons for all-round defence. I sent one man 
back with the prisoners and also Sergeant 
Macey to guide "A" Squadron across. The 
remaining thirteen of us were painfully few for 
the task at hand. All of this had taken about 
30 minutes from the time we first reached the 
river bank. 
The enemy had seen us taking the prisoners 
out and was now turning his attention to us. A 
sniper in a tree about 150 yards away opened 
up, and although he was an astonishingly poor 
shot, he was nevertheless very annoying. I 
fired two shots at him from a PlAT and the 
second one exploded in the branches. His rifle 
fell to the ground and the sniper slumped 
across a branch like a bag of grain. 
So far, the operation was going quite 
successfully. I had seized the bridgehead and 
could now expect to be reinforced by "A" 
Company of the Westminster Regiment followed 
closely by the remainder of the battalion. 
Unfortunately the route taken by the tracked 
vehicles proved impractical for the White Scout 
Cars of the motor companies. The engineers · 
did not get a route forward as quickly as had 
been expected, and it was necessary for the 
motor company to feel its way forward over 
difficult going in the face of artillery and small 
arms fire. It was apparent that I would have to 
hold on by myself for some considerable time. 
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The original idea had been to get "A" Squadron 
across as quickly as possible. About this time, 
however, two Panthers and a Self-Propelled 
(SP) 88 made their appearance to my left, that 
is the east, the closest being about 400 yards 
away. They began a slow rate of fire with high 
explosive (HE) on the house I was occupying. 
Fortunately none of these did any damage, but 
the position was definitely becoming very warm. 
The tanks and SP tuned the bulk of their 
attention to "A" Squadron on the far bank and 
started to cause damage in the squadron 
headquarters and the two rear troops. It was 
apparent that "A" Squadron was suffering 
heavily and it was increasingly doubtful whether 
they could cross the river. I could see from "A" 
Squadron's reply to the fire that they had not 
located the source of the trouble, particularly 
the SP 88 which was causing particular damage. 
I therefore turned over 
command to Corporal 
McLean and recrossed the 
river with the object of 
pointing out the target to 
"A" Squadron. I stood on 
the back of first Captain 
Whittle's, and later 
Lieutenant MacKinnon's 
tanks, while they tried to 
knock out the target. Either 
because they were unable 
to identify the target or 
because the range was too 
long, they were 
unsuccessful. I then 
returned across the river. 
It was about this time 
Sergeant Macey returned. 
He also realized that "A" 
Squadron would be unable 
to cross, but he had found 
my tank which Sergeant 
Lofvendah had managed to 
repair and brought it over 
the river. I did not bring it 
up the bank, but placed it 
some distance below the 
crest as a rallying point in 
case we were forced out of 
our position. The situation 
was now becoming very 
difficult. 
38 
There was a house on our left about 150 or 
200 yards away. Spandau fire came from the 
house at intervals and about twenty infantry 
were observed in the vicinity. I felt certain the 
enemy was concentrating in order to wipe out 
our small bridgehead and kept up a heavy fire 
from small arms, particularly the .50s with the 
objective of confusing him as to our strength. 
We had the satisfaction of causing him at least 
a few casualties, including two hits by .50s. I 
would have liked to make use of the PlAT, but 
decided to conserve ammunition in case of an 
Right: Air Photo of Melfa River, 19 March 1944, 
(altitude 25,000'). (LCMSDS Air Photo Collection) 
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attack by the enemy tanks. These were moving 
about considerably and from time-to-time were 
turning their attention on us. Nearly all oftheir 
shots were high and the shells were exploding 
about 50 yards behind us, and by great good 
fortune caused no casualties. There was no 
doubt that if the enemy chose to employ his 
tanks and infantry for the purpose, he could 
have driven us out of the bridgehead. The 
urgent need was for infantry with which we 
could expand the bridgehead, get tanks across 
and so continue the advance. I reported all of 
this to the CO who could do very little for me 
except request that the infantry brigade be 
pushed forward as quickly as possible. This 
was about 1600 hours. The tanks were fighting 
hard on the near bank and were unable to give 
me much support. The CO gave me permission 
to recross the river if necessary. However, as 
we had so far succeeded in bluffing the enemy 
as to our strength, I decided to hold on- but 
the decision was not an easy one. 
At about 1700 hours, "A" Company of the 
Westminster Regiment under Major Mahony 
started to arrive, first one platoon and then the 
remainder of the company. The good luck 
which we had unfortunately did not extend to 
them and they had several casualties including 
one man killed within two minutes of reaching 
the position. Major Mahony quickly organized 
an attack on the house to my left. This was 
captured, together with twenty prisoners, at 
the cost of some casualties. The SP 88 to my 
left was still doing damage and Trooper Funk 
volunteered to take it out with a PlAT covered 
by two Bren gunners of the Westminster 
Regiment. He crept along the bank of the river 
until he was about 150 yards from the SPat 
which time he fired one round. This exploded 
prematurely owing to overhanging foliage. 
Trooper Funk then crept forward to a spot from 
which he could get a better shot. At a range of 
about 100 yards, his next shot was higher and 
another low, but the final shot hit the 
suspension following which the crew bailed 
out. One was shot with the Bren gun and the 
remainder were eventually captured. After 
this, the two Panthers pulled back to a range of 
about 800 yards. Shortly after this, a patrol 
which had been pushed out to the right flank, 
reported that the enemy was massing on this 
flank, which hitherto had been quiet, in 
preparation for an attack. 
40 
Trooper Jacob Funk 
(LdSH(RC) Museum) 
Major Mahony asked me ifi could push my 
tanks out on the right flank so as to give him 
support. I asked if any tanks had been seen on 
the right and was told there was one and 
possibly more. I pointed out that the fire power 
of a cut-down Stuart against a Panther was 
inconsiderable and that to expose them to fire 
from the tanks would be virtual suicide; while 
if we kept them under cover, we might succeed 
in bluffing the enemy as to our true strength, 
since we might persuade him that we had good 
APweapons. It was extremely hard to deny this 
request for fire support. On the other hand, I 
felt there would be no advantage in attempting 
to do the impossible. A few minutes later, one 
of the Westminster carriers which had come 
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over with Major Mahony, pushed out about 
300 yards on his own initiative, apparently 
with the objective of securing the infantry's 
flank. Before he could see his danger, the 
enemy tanks swept in from the left front, cut 
him off and surrounded him. A few seconds 
later they moved back to their former positions 
with the carrier and any remaining members of 
its crew in the middle of them. 
Shortly before dusk, we were attacked from 
the front by three Panthers followed at some 
distance by about 100 infantry. The tanks 
came in from about 400 yards firing HE as they 
came. Most of the fire was high. The aerials 
were clipped off two of my tanks, butfortunately, 
there were no casualties. We fired everything 
we had from .50s to Tommy guns. We also fired 
PlATs, although the range was too long, with 
the objective of persuading the enemy that we 
had anti-tank weapons. This seemed to have 
succeeded, as the tanks swerved off at about 
175 yards and did not press the attack. A few 
minutes later, the tanks again attacked and 
again we fired everything we had. I was climbing 
into my own tank to fire the . 50 when an HE hit 
a few feet away. It knocked down the remaining 
aerial and spattered the vicinity with fragments. 
One of them scratched me on the cheek, but 
did no serious damage, although I was 
somewhat dazed from the concussion for several 
minutes. Visibility was becoming very limited 
and PlAT ammunition was running low. 
Fortunately the tanks once again did not press 
their attack, and when they withdrew, they did 
not again attack, although they remained in 
the vicinity about 1000 yards away and were a 
source of no little concern to us. 
About this time, "C" Company of the 
Westminsters got across on our right. This 
strengthened the position considerably, 
although "B" Company which were crossing 
quite a long way to our left were unable to get 
over until after dark. We began to dig in, which 
we did with considerable enthusiasm as the 
enemy started to put over large numbers of 
N ebelwerfer bombs. Fortunately most of these 
were about 50 yards over, landing in the river 
bed where they caused no damage. This fire 
kept up for most of the night and our slit 
trenches which started out about nine inches 
deep,were a good four feet before morning. 
Although I had spotted several good artillery 
targets, I had so far been unable to get artillery 
fire to bear on them. All of our Forward 
Observation Officers (FOOs) had either had 
their vehicles destroyed or were out of range of 
their guns. About this time I made another try 
for artillery support. I discovered that one of 
our scout cars was parked alongside a FOO 
tank. This tank had only one set which was on 
the battery frequency, but relaying messages 
through the scout car, I was able to talk to the 
FOO. The FOO turned out to belong to, of all 
things, a Jeep battery, but his guns were in 
action. The Jeep battery with its midget 75 mm 
guns had seemed rather comic when the 
operation was planned, but now the mighty 
mediums were silent and the Jeep guns did 
Yeoman service. Throughout the night, the 
FOO brought fire down on various targets 
which I indicated including the enemy tank 
harbour, areas in which movement was seen or 
heard and probable forming-up places. In all, 
the FOO fired about 1000 rounds, I do not 
know whether he did much damage. Still it 
must have worried the enemy some and the 
sound of our own guns was encouragement of 
the best kind. 
Towards morning, the Nebelwerfer fire 
increased and from time-to-time there were 
bursts of Spandau fire. Several times the 
enemy went to the trouble of smoking our 
positions and each time we expected an 
immediate attack. Although the attack never 
materialized, it was a nerve-wracking business. 
The Jeep battery played a part in discouraging 
the enemy - or perhaps he was only bluffing. 
At about 0500 hours I talked to several of my 
men about where the Nebelwefer fire was coming 
from and got a fairly good idea of the general 
area. In response to my request, the Jeep guns 
shelled it and the Nebelwerfers were silent for 
nearly an hour. Later when they opened up 
again, the Jeep battery was too short of 
ammunition to repeat the process, but the 
adjutant whose tank, containing the rear link, 
was knocked out about half a mile from the 
river bank, saw an arty vehicle from 6th 
Armoured Division proceeding along the road. 
We rushed out on the road and stopped it. It 
turned out to contain a FOO from their SP 
regiment. Fortunately, this officer's guns were 
in action and he was willing to take on any 
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targets we could locate. I pointed out quite a 
number, using map references and corrections 
by the cardinal point system. Unfortunately 
we did not again succeed in silencing the 
Nebelwerfers and they continued to make things 
uncomfortable during most of the morning. 
The house to my left which the Westminster 
Regiment had captured that previous evening, 
had to be abandoned during the night as our 
numbers were too small to hold it. The enemy 
had re-occupied it and was becoming very 
troublesome. At first light, the Westminster 
Regiment attacked and captured it suffering 
some casualties in the process. 
An attack had been scheduled for first light 
by the Irish Regiment of Canada which was 
assembled on the rear bank ready to cross. 
This was postponed until 0930 hours and later 
until 1130 hours due to the difficulty of teeing 
up supporting fire. At about 0600 hours, the 
CO ordered me to return to the rear bank. The 
situation was still not too secure and the heavy 
weapons of the recce troop made it of greater 
value than its numbers would indicate. I 
therefore requested permission to remain until 
the infantry attack was completed. This was 
granted. As the infantry attack went in, we 
fired our remaining ammunition to support it 
and at about 1215 hours we returned to the far 
bank after an extremely eventful 24 hours. 
E.J. Perkins served with the Lord 
Strathcona's Horse (Royal Canadians) 
in the Second World War. He won one of 
the few Distinguished Service Orders 
awarded to Lieutenants for his actions 
at the Melfa River. 
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